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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the lower court err in interpreting the parties' lease agreement to read

that Rite Aid could offset its property tax reimbursement payments made in one calendar
year against percentage rental payments accruing in a different calendar year?
Standard of review: Correctness. Interpretation of the terms of a contract
is a question of law. An appellate court will accord no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions regarding the contract and will review them for correctness. Nova Cas. Co.
v. Able Constr. Inc.. 983 P.2d 575, 577-78 (Utah 1999).
2.

Did the lower court err in holding that Rite Aid could demand

reimbursements of percentage rent overpayments several years after the fact, when Rite
Aid had failed to exercise its option for deductions during the time required by the parties'
lease agreement?
Standard of review: Correctness. Because entitlement to summary judgment
is a question of law, an appellate court accords no deference to the trial court's resolution
of the legal issues presented. An appellate court determines only whether the trial court
erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly made a
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determination as to the presence of disputed issues of material fact. Glover ex rel. Dyson
v.Roy Scouts. 923 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Utah 1996)
3.

Did the lower court err in finding that Rite Aid was not in default of the

parties' lease agreement and in denying Hillside's unlawful detainer claim?
Standard of review: Correctness. Because entitlement to summary judgment
is a question of law, an appellate court accords no deference to the trial court's resolution
of the legal issues presented. An appellate court determines only whether the trial court
erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly made a
determination as to the presence of disputed issues of material fact. Glover ex rel. Dyson
v Roy Scouts. 923 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Utah 1996).
4.

Did the lower court err in awarding Rite Aid attorneys fees and interest

against Hillside when Hillside was never in material breach of the parties' lease agreement,
but was, at worst, the unwitting holder of gratuitous and mistaken overpayments
voluntarily made by Rite Aid and only retracted by Rite Aid several years after the fact?
Standard of review: Correctness. Whether attorneys fees [and costs] are
recoverable in a given action is a question of law, which an appellate court reviews for
correctness. Also, whether the trial court's findings of fact in support of an award of
attorneys fees are sufficient is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998).
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5.

Did the lower court err in awarding Rite Aid attorneys fees and interest

against Hillside when Hillside was never in material breach of the parties' lease agreement,
but was rather arguing a good-faith interpretation of the lease, which position was
necessitated by an arguably ambiguous provision of the lease drafted by Rite Aid and by
Rite Aid's own careless and dilatory behavior in mistakenly making overpayments, and
then demanding the same in their entirety for the first time several years after the fact?
Standard of review. Correctness. Whether attorneys fees [and costs] are
recoverable in a given action is a question of law, which an appellate court reviews for
correctness. Also, whether the trial court's findings of fact in support of an award of
attorneys fees are sufficient is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998).
6.

Did the lower court err in awarding Rite Aid its attorneys fees and costs

where they were not submitted to the lower court by way of an affidavit of attorneys fees
and costs as required by Rule 4-505 of the Utah Rules of Administration, but rather were
submitted for the first time in Rite Aid's proposed Order, thereby depriving Hillside of any
meaningful opportunity to review the basis for or reasonableness of such claimed fees and
costs?
Standard of review. Correctness. In determining whether a trial court
correctly applied the governing law, an appellate court will give no deference to the trial
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court's legal conclusions, but will review them for correctness. S.W. Energy Corp. v.
ContMIns. Co.. 1999 UT 23, 974 P.2d 1239, 1f 11.
7.

Did the lower court err in awarding interest for sums at issue prior to April

1999, the first date Hillside was apprised of the mistaken overpayments in its possession?
Standard of review. Correctness. A trial court's decision to grant or deny
prejudgment interest presents a question of law which an appellate court reviews for
correctness. Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, 5 P.3d 616, 1 73.
8.

Did the lower court err in awarding Rite Aid interest during periods when

Rite Aid offset its claimed overpayments against accruing rental payments it otherwise
owed Hillside, and as such, during periods when Hillside no longer had possession or the
benefit of the monies being offset?
Standard of review. Correctness. A trial court's decision to grant or deny
prejudgment interest presents a question of law which an appellate court reviews for
correctness. Lyon v. Burton. 2000 UT 19, 5 P.3d 616, f 73.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES
None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.

This case involves the interpretation of several contractual

provisions of the parties' commercial lease agreement, in particular a provision allowing the
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tenant's property tax reimbursement payments to be deducted from percentage rent payments
for particular time periods.
Course of Proceedings.

On March 30, 2000, Rite Aid filed a Complaint seeking:

(1) a declaration that Rite Aid was not in monetary default of its lease rental obligations (by
virtue of having offset certain property tax reimbursement payments against certain
percentage rent obligations, albeit several years after the fact); and (2) refund of percentage
rent payments for certain past calendar years.

On April 14, 2000, Hillside filed a

Counterclaim seeking an order of restitution of the leasehold premises in favor of Hillside,
as well as treble damages for Rite Aid's unlawful detainer.
On June 9, 2000, Hillside filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asking the lower
court to dismiss Rite Aid's Complaint as a matter of law, and granting Hillside judgment on
its Counterclaim. On June 29, 2000, Rite Aid filed a Cross-motion for Summary Judgment.
In July, 2000, both parties filed Notices to Submit for Decision on their respective motions.
Disposition in the Trial Court. Neither party requested oral argument on its
motion, and the lower court decided those motions on submission. On August 4, 2000, the
lower court entered two Minute Entries without any comment or reasoning, and merely
indicated the Court's decision by way of check marks: granting Rite Aid's Cross-motion for
Summary Judgment and denying Hillside's Motion for Summary Judgment.
On August 28, 2000, Rite Aid submitted a proposed Order and Summary Judgment
to the lower court. Rite Aid did not submit an affidavit of attorneys fees and costs prior to
5

that date, but merely included such fees and costs as part of its proposed Summary7 Judgment.
On September 6, 2000, Hillside filed an Objection to Rite Aid's proposed Order and
Summary Judgment, arguing that those documents imported and incorporated new material
and issues never adduced prior to the lower court's ruling, and to which Hillside had
inadequate opportunity to respond. Among such items were: (1) Rite Aid's claim for and
calculation of prejudgment interest, particularly where such interest was charged on
gratuitous and mistaken overpayments on Rite Aid's part, and for time periods during which
Hillside either had no knowledge of nor control over certain of the overpayments at issue;
and (2) Rite Aid's inclusion of attorneys fees where the case involved the parties' conflicting
but good-faith and reasonable interpretations of arguably ambiguous contractual provisions
rather than a clear and knowing breach of the same. On September 21, 2000, the lower court
again entered a Minute Entry devoid of any comment or explanatory reasoning, and merely
indicated by check mark that Hillside's Objection to Rite Aid's proposed Order and
Summary Judgment was denied. Rite Aid's proposed Order and Summary Judgment were
signed on September 21, 2000, and Summary Judgment was entered in the registry of
judgments on September 27, 2000.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about May 6, 1974, the parties' respective predecessors-in-interest

entered into a lease agreement for certain commercial leasehold property. (R. at 9-29.)
2.

A material provision of the parties' lease agreement required the tenant to
6

provide the landlord a statement of gross sales derived from the leasehold premises during
a given calendar year as well as pay that given calendar year's percentage rent (as determined
by gross sales and in addition to monthly rental payments) on or before March 1 of the
following calendar year. (R. at 9-11.)
3.

Another provision of the parties' lease agreement required the landlord to pay

taxes levied against the leasehold premises and further required the tenant to reimburse the
landlord for such taxes paid, but further provided that "[a]ll amounts paid by tenants
pursuant to this article, may be deducted by Tenant from any percentage rent due for the
calendar year in which such taxes werepaid[.]" (R. at 11; emphasis added.)
4.

On April 19,1999, Rite Aid corresponded with Hillside, asserting that Rite Aid

had not offset tax reimbursement payments against applicable percentage rent for the years
calendar 1994, 1995, and 1996, and demanded repayment from Hillside of an amount equal
to the offsets Rite Aid had earlier failed to claim. (R. at 87.)
5.

Rite Aid had failed to make any claims for percentage rent overpayments

allegedly occurring in calendar years 1994,1995 or 1996 until calendar year 1999. (R. at 74,
105 and 123.)
6.

On May 20, 1999, Hillside responded to Rite Aid's demand by: (1) asserting

that Rite Aid had waived its right to offsets for any particular calendar year when Rite Aid
proceeded to make percentage rental payments without invoking its option as to such offsets;
(2) asserting that Rite Aid had inappropriately offset tax reimbursement payments made in
7

calendar year 1998 for percentage rent accrued in calendar year 1997; and (3) demanding
payment of the 1997 percentage rent inappropriately offset and not paid by Rite Aid. (R. at
89-91.)
7.

On June 21,1999, Rite Aid responded by announcing that it would deduct from

future rental payments amounts that it claimed it had failed to offset for calendar years 1994,
1995 and 1996. (R.at93.)
8.

Pursuant to Rite Aid's announced intent, Rite Aid proceeded to deduct

$5,000.00 from each of its monthly rental payments made in the months of July, August and
September of calendar year 1999. (R. at 75, 106 and 123.)
9.

On September 17, 1999, Hillside, through its counsel, served Rite Aid with

" 15-Day Notice of Monetary Default," demanding the $15,000.00 deducted from 1999
monthly rental payments in addition to the 1997 percentage rent payment Rite Aid had failed
to pay. (R. at 95-96.)
10.

On September 28, 1999, Rite Aid made payment of the $15,000.00 under

protest. (R. at 98.)
11.

Hillside paid the 1999 property taxes assessable against the leasehold premises

at or about the time such taxes were due. (R. at 75, 106 and 124.)
12.

Rite Aid drafted a check for reimbursement to Hillside of 1999 calendar year

property taxes in the amount of $17,000.14, but did not send such payment until at least
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January 3, 2000, the actual date postmarked on the envelope containing the reimbursement
payment mailed to Hillside. (R. at 76, 106 and 124.)
13.

Rite Aid's 1999 tax reimbursement in the amount of $17,000.14 was not paid

in the 1999 calendar year, but in the 2000 calendar year, since Rite Aid retained possession
of the check until at least January 3, 2000. (R. at 76, 107 and 124.)
14.

On January 26, 2000, Rite Aid provided Hillside a financial report for the

calendar year 1999 whereby it attempted to offset its 1999 tax reimbursement made in
calendar year 2000 ($17,000.14) against its percentage rent due for 1999 ($7,320.48), thereby
attempting to eliminate its 1999 percentage rent payment. (R. at 76, 107 and 124)
15.

On February 17,2000, Hillside sent correspondence to Rite Aid informing Rite

Aid that its attempted offset of tax reimbursements made in calendar year 2000 against
percentage rent due for calendar year 1999 was inappropriate, asked Rite Aid to correct this
error, and requested payment of the calendar year 1999 percentage rent on or before March
1, 2000 per the terms of the lease agreement. (R. at 46.)
16.

Rite Aid failed to pay the percentage rent due for 1999 on or before March 1,

2000, as requested by Hillside. (R. at 76, 107 and 124.)
17.

On March 14,2000, Hillside, through its counsel, gave Rite Aid formal written

notice, pursuant to the parties' lease agreement, of Rite Aid's opportunity to cure its failure
to pay the percentage rent due for calendar year 1999 within fifteen days. (R. at 44-45.)
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18.

Rite Aid failed to cure its previous failure to pay the percentage rent due for

calendar year 1999 within fifteen days of receiving Hillside's fifteen-day notice to cure. (R.
at 77, 107 and 124.)
19.

On April 6,2000, Hillside served Rite Aid's manager at the leasehold premises

in question a three-day notice to pay rent or vacate the leasehold premises. (R. at 102-03.)
20.

Rite Aid failed to either pay its rent or vacate the leasehold premises within

three days of receiving Hillside's three-day notice to pay rent or vacate. (R. at 77, 108 and
124.)
21.

To date, Rite Aid has failed to vacate the leasehold premises and continues to

occupy the same. (R. at 77, 108 and 124.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Rite Aid could only offset tax reimbursements paid in any given calendar year against
percentage rental payments accruing in the same calendar year, and the lower court erred in
finding otherwise. Any tax reimbursement offsets that were not claimed within the year of
actual percentage rental payment were waived, and Rite Aid's failure to claim offsets until
three to five years after the fact acted as an implied waiver, and the lower court erred as a
matter of law in finding otherwise. Because Rite Aid failed to pay certain amounts due and
owing under the parties' lease agreement, and despite Hillside's notice of and demand for
payment of the same, Rite Aid became in default of the lease as a matter of law, and became
in unlawful detainer of the leasehold premises, and the lower court erred in failing to so hold.
10

The lower court erred in awarding attorneys fees where there was no material breach of the
parties' lease agreement on Hillside's part, and where an affidavit of attorneys fees was never
submitted as required by the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. The lower court erred
in awarding prejudgment interest where such interest was derivative of overpayments for
time periods where Hillside had no such knowledge of such putative overpayments and
where Rite Aid unilaterally offset rental payments against such alleged overpayments thereby
depriving Hillside of control over such monies.
ARGUMENT
I.

BY THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT, RITE AID COULD NOT OFFSET
PROPERTY TAX REIMBURSEMENTS MADE IN ONE CALENDAR YEAR
AGAINST PERCENTAGE RENTAL PAYMENTS ACCRUING IN A
DIFFERENT CALENDAR YEAR.
Section 4 of the parties' Lease Agreement provides in pertinent part that Rite Aid, at

its option, may deduct its tax reimbursement payments made to Hillside from any percentage
rent otherwise due to Hillside and "due for the calendar year in which such taxes were paid":
Landlord shall pay or cause to be paid all taxes levied against the Shopping
Center, including general property taxes and special improvement taxes or
assessments^]... Tenant agrees to reimburse Landlord for the amount of such
taxes assessed against the Premises during the original term of this Lease [.]
. . . Tenant shall also reimburse Landlord for its pro rata share of the general
property taxes assessed against the Common Areas
Tenant shall reimburse
Landlord for its share of such general property taxes within 30 days after
receipt by Tenant of a statement setting forth the amount due Landlord under
the provisions of this article, together with the original tax bill or a true copy
thereof and a computation of the amount to be paid by Tenant, determined as
provided in this article. All amounts paid by Tenant pursuant to this article,
may be deducted by Tenant from any percentage rent due for the calendar
11

year in which such taxes were paid, regardless of who may own Landlord's
interest in this Lease at the time.
(R. at 11; emphasis added.) The language of this provision is clear and unambiguous on its
face: Rite Aid has the option of deducting tax reimbursement payments from percentage rent
due in the same calendar year in which Rite Aid made such tax reimbursement payments.
Conversely, Rite Aid—as a matter of plain contractual interpretation—cannot offset its tax
payments made in one calendar year against percentage rental accruing in a different
calendar year, nor does it have the discretion to do so.
It is undisputed that Rite Aid did not make its tax reimbursement payment for 1999
property taxes until the calendar year 2000. Therefore, Rite Aid was free to offset its
payment made in calendar year 2000 against percentage rentals that accrued in calendar year
2000. However, as a matter of clear contractual interpretation, it cannot offset its tax
reimbursement payment made in calendar year 2000 against percentage rental liabilities
accruing in any other calendar year either prior or subsequent to calendar year 2000.
Therefore, Rite Aid's first cause of action, asking that its calendar year 2000 tax
reimbursement payment be offset against its percentage rent accrued for calendar year 1999,
should have been disallowed, and the lower court erred as a matter of law in granting Rite
Aid summary judgment on this cause of action.
Likewise, the same reasoning applies for the "overpayment" Rite Aid sought for the
calendar year 1997 in its second cause of action. Rite Aid attempted to offset tax
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reimbursements made in calendar 1998 against percentage rent accrued in calendar year
1997. As demonstrated above, the clear terms of the parties' lease agreement do not allow
this. Rite Aid had no cognizable basis upon which to demand return of this alleged
"overpayment" for the same reasons that it should have been disallowed from making the
offset it claimed in its first cause of action. Accordingly, that portion of Rite Aid's second
cause of action that related to alleged overpayments for calendar 1997 should have been
disallowed, and the lower court again erred as a matter of law in granting Rite Aid summary
judgment on this portion of its second cause of action.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the parties' lease agreement requires Rite Aid to
make its tax reimbursement payments within thirty days of notice. Rite Aid was well aware
of Hillside's obligation to pay property taxes by November 30 of each year and of Rite Aid's
consequent obligation to reimburse Hillside within thirty days, and therefore could not, and
did not, claim surprise, excusable neglect, or any identifiable action on the part of Hillside
as the reason for its otherwise unexplained failure to make reimbursement payments before
the end of the calendar year.
At the lower court below, Rite Aid argued that as long as Hillside made a timely
property tax payment, Rite Aid was thereby free to offset its reimbursement payments against
subsequent years' percentage rents, and that the timeliness requirement in the lease
agreement applied to Hillside, not Rite Aid. In other words, Rite Aid argued for turning the
lease agreement on its head by hinging Rite Aid's ability to offset tax reimbursements against
13

percentage rent upon the timeliness of Hillside's property tax payments to Salt Lake County,
not the timeliness of Rite Aid's reimbursements to Hillside. Such a counter-intuitive
interpretation not only enables Rite Aid to escape any practical limitations on offset due to
Rite Aid's own dilatory behavior, but in fact constructs an offset mechanism that is openended and subject to no practical time limitations whatsoever. As long as Hillside (and not
Rite Aid) makes a timely payment of property taxes to the county, Rite Aid is thereby free
to make its reimbursement in the next calendar year, or even later if it so chooses, and then
at some unspecified time in the future (perhaps even six years later), claim an offset (or some
cumulative number of them) based on the fortuitous fact that Hillside (not Rite Aid) paid
"such taxes" during the relevant year(s). That clearly would be a one-sided arrangement
whereby: (1) Hillside has a two-fold burden of making timely tax payments every year, and
having to be prepared at any moment's notice at some time in the indeterminate future to
honor Rite Aid's demand for unexercised and perhaps cumulative offsets; and (2) Rite Aid
enjoys the windfall of making its tax reimbursement payment to Hillside in a generally
untimely fashion or whenever Rite Aid may see fit, being under no compulsion to exercise
its offsets in a timely manner or even for years, and enjoying an open-ended opportunity to
exercise and enforce such offsets at any undetermined time in the future.

Such an

arrangement would rightly be held illusory, since Rite Aid is in sole control of the conditions
precedent under which it will perform, while at the same time claiming an absolute right to
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compel Hillside's performance. (This is in fact what Rite Aid is doing with its claims for
unrealized offsets for calendar years 1994 through 1996.)
Rite Aid's strained interpretation of lease requirements and the resultant open-ended
enforceability of the parties' offset provision would render the parties' relationship largely
unworkable due to the uncertainty and ambiguity Rite Aid's interpretation would introduce
into the parties' relationship. It is a basic tenet of contract interpretation that an interpretation
rendering a contract definite, enforceable and workable should be favored over one that
renders the contract ambiguous, unworkable and illusory. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v.
Stewart. 291 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1955).
II.

RITE AID WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO OFFSET FOR GIVEN CALENDAR
YEARS WHEN IT FAILED TO EXERCISE SUCH RIGHT WITHIN THOSE
CALENDAR YEARS, AND IT CANNOT DEMAND THEM SEVERAL YEARS
AFTER THE FACT IN A CUMULATIVE FASHION.
In calendar year 1999, Rite Aid: (1) asserted for the first time that it overpaid its

percentage rents for each of the calendar years 1994 through 1996; and (2) demanded, also
for the first time, a reimbursement for amounts allegedly overpaid during those years. Rite
Aid's claimed "overpayments" arise from tax reimbursement offsets it failed to make or
assert against percentage rent payments during the calendar years in question.
As such, Rite Aid was unable to make a reimbursement demand in 1999, or now, for
the basic reason that it has waived its opportunity to demand reimbursement for the years in
question. A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. K & T. Inc. v.
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Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994). In Utah, %*waiver requires three elements: (1) an
existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to
relinquish the right." Id at 628-29. "The intention to relinquish the right may be either
expressed or implied and may be implied from action or inaction" (emphasis added). Id at
629. Inaction can lead to waiver where its effect is to lead a party to conclude that the
inactive party is not claiming the right, benefit, or advantage which otherwise may be due
it:

Under the doctrine of waiver, the unexpressed, subjective reasons for the
relinquishment of a right are largely irrelevant. The question whether waiver
will be found in any particular case depends not upon the secret intention of
the party against whom it is asserted, but upon the effect which his conduct has
had upon the other party. Stated another way, one cannot prevent a waiver by
a private mental reservation contrary to an intent to waive, where his or her
actions clearly indicate such an intent.
B.R. Woodward Marketing, Inc. v. Collins Food Service, Inc.. 754 P.2d 99, 103 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (food distributor failing to demand
monthly incentive commissions over one-year time period where otherwise provided by
contract deemed to have waived right to those commissions for months in question). While
waiver is obviously more clear and distinct where there is an express relinquishment, it can
also be implied from conduct or silence when "there is some duty or obligation to speak."
Soter's v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan, 857 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993).
In the present instance, all three elements of waiver are satisfied. First, Paragraph 4
of the parties' lease agreement allows Rite Aid to offset a given year's tax reimbursement
16

payments against the same year's accrued percentage rent, albeit on Rite Aid's initiative.
Second, a party to a contract is deemed to know and be aware of the provisions of that
contract. Third, Rite Aid's inaction for a three- to five-year period in failing to assert
presumptively known contractual rights is just the type of inaction that reasonably led
Hillside to conclude that Rite Aid was not invoking the offset for the calendar years in
question, and to make business decisions and expenditures accordingly.
Once percentage rent for a given calendar year has accrued and is identifiable, Rite
Aid has until March 1 of the following calendar year in which to pay such an amount. (See
R. at 9-11.) Conversely, any tax reimbursement offset allocable to the same calendar year
and that could have been asserted prior to or at the time of payment of percentage rent is
waived if not made at the time of payment. In other words, offsets not claimed within the
contractual time of payment are waived. This is evidenced by: (1) the discretionary language
of the parties' lease agreement allowing offsets at the tenant's initiative and discretion;1 in
tandem with (2) the mandatory language requiring percentage rent to be paid before a date
certain.2

1

Section 4 of the Lease Agreement reads in pertinent part: "All amounts paid
by Tenant pursuant to this article, may be deducted by Tenant from any percentage rent due
for the calendar year in which such taxes were paid" (R. at 11; emphasis added).
2

Section 3 of the Lease Agreement reads in pertinent part: "Payment of such
percentage rent, if any, shall bt made on or before March 1st of each year for the preceding
calendar year" (R. at 9; emphasis added).
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Furthermore, waiver can be implied from Rite Aid's silence as well as its inaction.
Rite Aid maintained an absolute silence for three to five years as to offsets for which Rite
Aid was otherwise allowed to make an election, but for which it failed to do so in even a
reasonably timely manner. As pointed out above, under the parties' lease agreement. Rite
Aid was required to generate and submit a percentage rent report, as well as pay its
percentage rent for a given calendar year, by March 1 of the following calendar year.
Applicable offsets should be reported in the percentage rent report submitted for a given
year. Hillside is entitled to rely on the accuracy of such reports, and has in fact relied on the
accuracy of such reports in making certain business decisions and making certain
expenditures. At no time did Hillside contemplate or expect that the reports would not reflect
material claims, such as offset, or that such material modifications for claims that could have
and should have been made in the original report could retroactively (and cumulatively) be
made at any time in the indeterminate future after the calendar year in question. If Rite Aid's
silence as to its purported offsets under these circumstances did not constitute a waiver, then
Rite Aid could fail to request offsets for an indeterminate number of years, either
sporadically or cumulatively, and only after the end of such indeterminate period demand a
refund of all offsets in one lump sum. This would convert Rite Aid's offsets into open-ended
and retroactive options of unlimited duration, and make Hillside's business planning and
capital expenditures uncertain and problematic.
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In other words, this situation is analogous to an optionee^ opportunity to exercise an
option by a contractually-specified deadline. An optionee is free to exercise or not exercise
his option within the specified time period. If he does so, his exercise will be honored
pursuant to the terms of the option agreement. If he fails to do so, or attempts to do so
beyond the specified deadline, he cannot then compel recognition of his exercise since he has
already lost his opportunity for exercise, i.e., the failure to exercise an available option is the
loss of an opportunity, not the loss of a contractual right.3 Another appropriate analogy is
that of the store coupon. Failure to redeem the coupon by its stated expiration date renders
the coupon useless, because the opportunity for redemption has passed. Here, where Rite
Aid has not exercised its opportunity for offset by the mandatory payment date, it has waived
such offset for the applicable calendar year.
On a less theoretical and more practical level, Rite Aid's demand for retroactive and
cumulative offsets is inconsistent with efficient or rational business practice. When an offset
is not requested prior to or concurrent with payment, and indeed is not even mentioned at the
time of payment, it is reasonable for the payee to assume that any such potential request has
been waived, particularly when such a request is wholly at the discretion of the payor but has
not otherwise been invoked or referenced by the payor. However, Rite Aid's position is that

3

Again, the permissive nature of the operative contractual language indicates
that an timely opportunity, not a retroactive right, is involved: "All amounts paid by Tenant
pursuant to this article, may be deducted by Tenant from any percentage rent due for the
calendar year in which such taxes were paid" (R. at 11; emphasis added.)
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a payee in Hillside's position should always have the cloud of unresolved offsets hovering
over it for an indeterminate amount of time into the future. Utah courts have recognized this
practical limitation by identifying inaction as a cognizable form of waiver where that
inaction leads a party to believe that the inactive party has chosen not to exercise its rights
or benefits, and the relying party then acts accordingly. In other words, inaction is to be
judged by an objective, not subjective, standard.
In short, Rite Aid's waiver can be implied from Rite Aid's failure to invoke the
discretionary offset clause contained in the parties' lease agreement, as well as from a totality
of the circumstances, particularly where: (1) Rite Aid, as party to that agreement, is deemed
to be cognizant of such terms and cannot excuse its inaction solely on the bases of mistake
or inattention in relation to the lease agreement; and (2) where such discretionary offsets,
from the face of the parties' lease agreement and the totality of the circumstances, were
clearly anticipated to be exercised on a yearly basis rather than an open-ended basis of
unlimited duration. In the totality of the circumstances, it was Rite Aid's three- to five-year
inaction and/or silence in failing to assert presumptively known contractual rights that
reasonably led Hillside to conclude that Rite Aid was not invoking the offset for the calendar
years in question, and to make certain business decisions and capital expenditures
accordingly. Because no material facts were in dispute in the proceedings below, but only
the purported effects of those undisputed facts, the lower court should have made a
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determination of waiver from the totality of the circumstances of this case as presented in the
parties' undisputed facts, and erred in not doing so.
III.

RITE AID WAS IN DEFAULT OF THE PARTIES' LEASE AGREEMENT,
AND WAS IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER AFTER ITS REFUSAL TO TIMELY
RESPOND TO HILLSIDE'S RIGHTFUL PAYMENT DEMANDS.
As discussed above, by the clear and unambiguous terms of the parties' lease

agreement, Rite Aid: (1) was unable to offset tax reimbursements paid in the 2000 calendar
year against its 1999 percentage rent payment due and owing on March 1, 2000; and thereby
(2) violated the material terms of the lease agreement in refusing to pay the percentage rent
payment due and owing on March 1, 2000. Furthermore, Rite Aid's refusal to pay
percentage rent due and owing Hillside, in contravention of the parties' lease agreement and
Hillside's rightful demands, constituted a material breach of the parties' lease agreement.
Therefore, Hillside was statutorily entitled to make demand on Rite Aid that it either pay rent
due and owing or vacate the leasehold premises. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-36-3(l)(c) and
78-36-6. It was undisputed below that Hillside did make such demand, and it was also
undisputed below that Rite Aid refused to either pay rent or vacate, and that it continued to
occupy the premises. As such, Rite Aid as a matter of law was (and is) in unlawful detainer
of the premises. Therefore, Hillside was statutorily entitled to a judgment awarding it
restitution of the premises, treble damages, and attorneys fees (see Utah Code Ann. § 78-3610), and the lower court erred in refusing to grant Hillside such relief as a matter of law.
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IV.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES AND
COSTS TO RITE AID.
The lower court's Minute Entry granting Rite Aid summary judgment was silent on

the issue of attorneys fees. Rite Aid imported an award of attorneys fees into its proposed
Summary Judgment, and the lower court incorporated such additional terms over Hillside's
objections.
Yet the fact remains, Hillside did not breach the parties' lease agreement. Though
Rite Aid ultimately prevailed below on the issue of contract interpretation, the conflict was
one almost wholly of Rite Aid's own making. Not only did Rite Aid make the gratuitous and
mistaken overpayments leading to the dispute, but it (through its predecessor-in-interest) also
drafted the ambiguous contractual provision upon which this case was ultimately decided.4
Had Hillside clearly, intentionally, or in bad faith breached the parties' contract, then an
award of attorneys fees would clearly be warranted. However, where Hillside makes a goodfaith argument based on its reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous contractual provision
4

The parties' leasehold agreement states: "This Lease, although drafted by
Tenant, shall be interpreted and construed only by the contents hereof and there shall be no
presumption or standard of construction in favor of or against either Landlord or Tenant."
(R. at 26.) The clear import of this passage is Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest's
acknowledgment of draftsmanship. Of lesser import is its attempt to waive the established
legal presumption that in cases of ambiguity, a contract is interpreted against its drafter.
Jones. Waldo. Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson. 923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah 1996)
(general rule of contract interpretation that ambiguous language is to be construed against
the drafter). Hillside has been unable to find authority for the proposition that a drafting
party can waive the presumption of construing ambiguities against the drafter, and would
therefore argue that Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest is not free to waive such a legal
presumption, particularly in such a self-serving manner.
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drafted by Rite Aid and in response to a situation that was created by Rite Aid's own careless
behavior, attorneys fees would be inappropriate, if not punitive. The lower court erred in
awarding attorneys fees.
V.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES AND
COSTS WHERE THE SAME WERE NEVER SUBMITTED BY WAY OF
AFFIDAVIT PRIOR TO ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.
Rule 4-505 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration states in pertinent part:
Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must be filed with the court
and set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work
performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim
to judgment... and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal
services.

(Emphasis added). In other words, an attorneys fees affidavit compliant with the terms of
Rule 4-505 is a mandatory prerequisite to any award of attorneys fees.
The lower court issued its Minute Entries on summary judgment, without comment
or mention of attorneys fees, on August 4,2000. Rite Aid was directed, by means of a check
mark, to prepare an order. At no time prior to August 28, 2000 did Rite Aid ever submit an
affidavit of attorneys fees and costs as required by Rule 4-505. On August 28, 2000, Rite
Aid submitted its proposed Order and Summary Judgment. Paragraph 4 of the proposed
Summary Judgment read: "Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant for its attorney
fees and costs in the amount of $5,040.00." No legal basis for such an award was identified,
nor was the nature of the work, time spent, or reasonableness of rates identified. Hillside
objected on the bases that the proposed Summary Judgment: (1) was untimely (outside of the
23

fifteen days mandated by Rule 4-505(1)); and (2) that by importing several terms never
addressed in arguments for summary judgment or by the lower court's Minute Entries (such
as attorneys fees and several items of interest), the proposed Summary Judgment did not
conform with the lower court's ruling. Hillside submitted its own proposed Summary
Judgment in conformance with the lower court's ruling, and in the alternative, asked the
lower court for a clarification of whether Rite Aid was in fact entitled to attorneys fees.
The lower court responded by denying Hillside's objections and requests, and
accepting Rite Aid's conclusory statement of attorneys fees, again without comment and by
way of a lone check mark. As such, Hillside has never had an opportunity to understand,
review or object to the legal basis, nature of work, or reasonableness of such attorneys fees.
The lower court erred in awarding attorneys fees without any corresponding affidavit, and
the error, depriving Hillside of any such of fee-related review and meaningful objection, is
not harmless.
VI.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING SEVERAL ITEMS OF
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.
Similar to the issue of attorneys fees, Rite Aid took advantage of the lower court's no-

comment Minute Entries to import awards of prejudgment interest into its proposed
Summary Judgment that were never argued or presented to the lower court up to that point.
Rite Aid justified the importation and scope of such items on the basis that since the lower
court's Minute Entries lacked any comment on the reasons for granting Rite Aid's summary
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judgment, that "Rite Aid accordingly inferred that the Court accepted Plaintiffs arguments."
(R. At 241.) However, Rite Aid then proceeded to go far beyond mere inference, and argued
that the lower court should retroactively accept and rule on issues never made nor adduced
prior to the court's issuance of its no-comment Minute Entries, and to which Hillside had no
opportunity to respond or dispute prior to the lower court's ruling.
Rite Aid never provided to Hillside or the lower court a prejudgment interest figure
on which it sought judgment at any time prior to the lower court's ruling. It did not provide
such a figure nor its underlying calculations in either its pleadings or arguments on summary
judgment. Instead, it belatedly presented such figures for the first time as a conclusory
paragraph in its proposed Summary Judgment. Rite Aid's retroactive incorporation of such
a "stealth" figure into a court ruling that never considered nor ruled on such a figure, and the
lower court's acceptance of the same despite Hillside's objections, is objectionable error for
several fundamental reasons.
First, as pointed out above, the interest figure and underlying calculations were never
presented to the lower court or Hillside prior to their conclusory presentation in the proposed
Summary Judgment. They were not introduced by way of affidavit, either pre- or postruling, but were asserted for the first time in conclusory fashion in Rite Aid's post-ruling
response. As such, Hillside had little to no opportunity to object to the accuracy of such nonidentified figures, their underlying calculations, or any of their underlying basic assumptions
such as whether prejudgment interest is even available in this scenario or the correct time or
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times when prejudgment interest should begin to accrue, if at all. Hillside was unable to
argue or dispute such points for the simple fact that Rite Aid at no time adduced or argued
them to the lower court prior to the lower court's ruling.
Second, Rite Aid and the lower court failed to cite any persuasive authority that would
allow prejudgment interest in this fact scenario involving an allegedly mistaken and
gratuitous overpayment. Rite Aid itself states that "prejudgment interest in Utah represents
an amount awarded as damages due to the defendants' delay in tendering an amount clearly
owing under an agreement or other obligation." (R. at 246; internal quotation marks and
citations omitted.) Here, the amounts at issue were not amounts that Hillside failed to pay
to Rite Aid pursuant to an identified time schedule or contractual obligation, but were instead
gratuitous and mistaken overpayments on the part of Rite Aid. Such overpayments were not
demanded by Hillside, Hillside did not accept them with knowledge that they were
mistakenly made, and Hillside was not aware until after April 1999 that Rite Aid believed
the payments were mistakenly made. Rite Aid argued, and the lower court accepted, a novel
and hitherto unaccepted legal theory that a party who ignorantly receives a gratuitous and
mistaken payment should be penalized for such unwitting acceptance of mistaken funds,
above and beyond merely repaying such funds. (Or to put it another way, Rite Aid converted
its mistaken overpayments into an involuntary loan agreement for which Hillside must pay
interest.) Hillside is unaware of any jurisdiction or commentator accepting this view, and
Rite Aid cited no case law supportive of such a view. As between the party mistakenly
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making the unnecessary payment and the ignorant party receiving it in good faith, equity
would require that the mistaken party bear the loss of opportunity cost on the funds at issue.
To put it more simply, as between two supposedly sophisticated business entities, the burden
of loss should be placed on the entity engaging in careless business and accounting practices.
Rite Aid argued, and the lower court accepted, that parties making business and accounting
errors should be protected from any adverse effect of such self-inflicted errors (and in effect
be relieved from any duty to mitigate damages), and that the financial cost of such errors
should instead be shifted onto other commercial parties otherwise dealing with the mistaken
parties in good faith. From a policy standpoint, widespread adoption of Rite Aid's novel nofault standard would only undermine confidence in business transactions as well as the legal
system at large.
Third, assuming for purposes of argument only that Rite Aid was entitled to any
amount of prejudgment interest in this particular fact scenario (which issue was never argued
before the lower court), such prejudgment interest could only begin to accrue at the very
earliest from April 1999, the date that Rite Aid first apprised Hillside of the allegedly
mistaken and gratuitous nature of Rite Aid's overpayments. To suggest any earlier accrual
date is to put into effect a punitive standard neither recognized at law nor in business, as
discussed above. It leads to the absurd result that the longer a mistakenly overpaying payor
takes in apprising an ignorant payee of the payor's mistake, the more the payor can collect
in interest charges at no ultimate cost to himself, the cost being borne entirely by the payee.
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The payee thus becomes the payor's own unwitting depository and guarantor of a 10%
interest rate, with accrued interest coming directly out of the payee's pocket on no other basis
than the payor's dilatoriness and negligence, whether intentional or not. Again, such a
standard that encourages, if not rewards, dilatory behavior, while at the same time
discouraging timely revelation and resolution of mistaken overpayments, can only undermine
confidence in business transactions as well as the legal system at large.
Fourth, even assuming that prejudgment interest could or should accrue from April
1999, Rite Aid and the lower court failed to account for the fact that the circumstances
justifying prejudgment interest did not apply for a significant amount of time between April
1999 and the lower court's ruling. Rite Aid's rationale for claiming prejudgment interest was
its assertion that "Hillside had the benefit of Rite Aid's money" for the period that Hillside
unwittingly received and held Rite Aid's allegedly mistaken and gratuitous overpayments.
(R. at 245.) However, at such time as Rite Aid offset such alleged overpayments against
rental payments otherwise due and owing Hillside, Hillside no longer "had the benefit" of
such alleged overpayments, at least in such amounts and for such length of time as Rite Aid
stopped making rental payments otherwise due and owing Hillside.

So calculating

prejudgment interest is not so simple a matter as applying a 10% rate from April 1999 to the
present; it must also take into account and accordingly discount those amounts and periods
of time subsequent to April 1999 when Rite Aid, not Hillside, had the effective benefit of
such alleged overpayments. Rite Aid never established that amount at the lower court level.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the lower court's Minute Entries should be reversed, and
this case remanded for a decision consistent with this Court's determination. Likewise, the
lower court's award of attorneys fees and prejudgment interest should be vacated as improper
and without legal basis.
DATED this £)^_ day of March, 2001.

KESLER & RUST

Sc/ottXJ. Mercer
AttorneVs for Appellant
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC.,
a California corporation d/b/a RITE AID;
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
HILLSIDE PLAZA LTD.? d/b/a
HILLSIDE PLAZA PROPERTIES,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:

Case No. 000902699
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

The Court, having granted Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
1.

The Court declares that Plaintiff is not in default under the lease with respect to 1999
percentage rents and that Plaintiff appropriately deducted the tax reimbursement
payment it made to Defendant from its 1999 percentage rents;

2.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant in the amounts of $5,550.07 for
1994 percentage rents, $5,500 for 1995 percentage rents, $8,259 for 1996 percentage
rents and $7,702.82 for 1997 percentage rents for a total of $27,011.89;

3.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant for pre-judgment interest calculated
from March 1 of the year following each year for which percentage rent was
calculated (e.g.,March 1, 1995, for the 1994 percentage rent) through August 31,
2000, in the following amounts: $3,052.50 for the 1994 percentage rent, $2,474.99
for the 1995 percentage rents, $2,890.65 for the 1996 percentage rents and $1,925.70
for the 1997 percentage rents, for a total award of pre-judgment interest in the
amount of $10,343.84;

4.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant for its attorneys fees and costs in the
amount of $5,040.00; and

5.

Plaintiff is awarded post-judgment interest at the rate of 7.67% on the total judgment
of $42,395.73 from the date this judgment is entered until it is paid.
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DATED this Z ( day of August, 2000.
BY THE COURT:

3

HO^OR^BLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
KESLER & RUST

Scott O. Mercer
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9&

day of August, 2000, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of

the Utah Code of Jud. Admin., I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served on the following for approval as to form via first class
mail, postage pre-paid:
Scott 0. Mercer
Jason H. Robinson
KESLER&RUST
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 2315
CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER, No. 5050
MORGAN, MEYER & RICE, L.C.
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888
Fax number: (801) 531-9732

SEp
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC.,
a California corporation d/b/a RITE AID;
Plaintiff,

:
:

vs.

:

HILLSIDE PLAZA LTD., d/b/a
HILLSIDE PLAZA PROPERTIES,

:
:
:
:

Defendant.

ORDER

Case No. 000902699
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment were submitted for decision. The Court, having read and considered the motions,
memoranda, and affidavits filed by the parties, and good cause appearing therefore, hereby

ORDERS that Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied and Plaintiffs motion
for summary judgment is granted for the reasons set forth in Plaintiffs memoranda supporting its
motion and opposing Defendant's motion.
DATED this L\day of3a}u&, 2000.
BY THE COURT:

H

HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
KESLER & RUST

Scott O. Mercer
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h e ^ S ^ d a v of August, 2000, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of
the Utah Code of Jud. Admin., I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed
ORDER to be served on the following for approval as to form via first class mail, postage prepaid:
Scott 0. Mercer
Jason H. Robinson
KESLER & RUST
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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LEASE AGREEMENT

THIS LEASE AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of the
day of
May 5
. 1971, between HILLSIDE ?LA2A ASSOCIATES,
a partnership. C"Landlord"J . and S K A C G S COMPANIES. INC., a Delaware
Corporation, ("Tenant") , and is the lease agreement referred to in that certain
lease of even date herewith between the parties hereto covering the premises
(the "Premises") at 70th South and 23rd East, Salt La*e County. Utah, consisting
of the outlined land area shaded in red and marked "Skaggs* an the plot plan
attached to said lease as Exhibit "A* which is located in the shopping center,
(the "Shopping Center' 1 ) , the present boundaries of which arc described on
Exhibit U 3 U attached to said l e a s e . This lease agreement is made to supplement
and complete such lease and is to be deemed a material pare thereof for all
purposes and to the same extent as i£ actually and fully set forth therein (such
lease and this lease agreement being hereinafter collectively referred to as
the "Lease-).
(1) PRELIMINARY TERM RENT. No rent shall be due or payable
during the preliminary term ex this Lease except such as may be due pursuant
to the article entitled "COMMENCEMENT OF ORIGLNAL TERM."
(2) ANNUAL RENT. Tenant agrees to pay Landlord during the
original term a£ lliis Lc^ae *u <ga\uw*l re*U of Fifty-*Fuur Thousand Six Hundred
Dollars ($54,600) in equal monthly installments of Four Thousand Five
Hundred and Fifty Dollars (54,550) payable on or before the tenth day of each
calendar month for the current calendar month. The annual rtm installment
for any fractional calendar month at the beginning of the original term shall
be prorated and paid on or before the tenth day of the calendar month following
commencement of the original term.
(3) PERCENTAGE RENT. On or before the first day of March
following each calendar year of the original term of this Lease. Tenant agrees
to mail or deliver to Landlord'a statement, signed by one of its officers, showing
the actual sales (computed as hereinafter provided) made in or from the Premises
during such year.
Should said s a l e s as so computed exceed the minimum sales base
. of Three Million Sbc Hundred Forty Thousand Dollars ($3.64Q..0QQ) in any
calendar year. Tenant agrees to pay Landlord as additional rem due hereunder
a sum equal to one and o n e - h a l f percent (1-1/2%) of such excess. Payment
of such percentage r e n t , if a n y , shall be made on or before March 1st of each
year for the preceding calendar y e a r .
In computing it3 saies for purposes of this article. Tenant shall
include the total g r o s s amount realized as the result af retail sales of merchandise
and services rendered by Tenant and its successors, subsidiaries or affiliated
corporations in or from the P r e m i s e s , except that there shall not be Included
in such computation the following: (I) the purchase price of all returned merchandise which is refunded or credited to the purchaser; (2) all receipts (including
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premiums. commissions and payments) .Vom lockers, weighing machines,
stamp machines or o t h e r similar coin-operated devices. puolic telephones.
pay toilets, travelers c h e c k s , money orders, easnmg and issuing of c h e c k s ,
payments of utility b i l l s or like s e r v i c e s , postage stamps and licenses sold
to the public: (3) s u m s or credits received in settlement at claims for loss
or damage to m e r c h a n d i s e : (4) all sales, use, excise, retailer's occupation
or other similar t a x e s , w h e t h e r now or hereafter imposed, and by whatever
name, which arc b a s e d u p o n the gross receipts of Tenant or upon the sale
or sales price of m e r c h a n d i s e or services sold by Tenant and which must be
paid by Tenant w h e t h e r o r not collected by Tenant from its customers; (5)
the return or transfer ox" merchandise from the ?r*3\\scs ID other stores or
warehouses of Tenant or i t s affiliated companies: (6) returns to vendors or
suppliers; (7) c h a r g e s p a i d or payable by customers for mailing or delivery
of merchandise; (8) s e r v i c e c h a r g e s , interest u\d collection expenses r e c e i v e d
or receivable from c u s t o m e r s for sales on credit; (9) the purchase price of
goods or services s o l d to employees of Tenani; (10) the net amount of discounts
allowed to any c u s t o m e r , i n c l u d i n g hut not limited to, discounts allowed by
way of or resulting from the issuance to customers of trading stamps or other
evidences of p u r c h a s e for immediate or future exchange tor merchandise or
other things of v a l u e ; (11) merchandise or other things of value issued by Tenant
in redemption ox trading stamps or other evidences of value or issued by T e n a n t
as a premium or o t h e r w i s e i n connection with any sales promotion program
of Tenant; and (12) s a l e s ax a discount to memebers of the medical p r o f e s s i o n .
Sales of merchandise
or services by concessionaires shall not
be include:< in the compulation of sales upon which Tenant pays percentage
rKit. bu* the nc: SLrnsur.t z£ commissions or similar payments received by T e n a n t
from or on account of s u c h c o n c e s s i o n s shall be included in such computation
of sales. Tenant a g r e e s that it will not permit the use of more than 2,800 s q u a r e
feet of the Premises b y any s u c h concessionaires. With respect to coin o p e r a t e d
vending machines on the P r e m i s e s , only Tenant's share or participation i n
the gross revenue therefrom shall be included in such computation of s a l e s .
For the s o l e p u r p o s e of ascertaining the amount of such sales*
Tenant agrees that Landlord or Landlord's agents, at Landlord's expense^
may inspect any and all of Tenant's records of sales made in or from the P r e m i s e s
(including sales tax r e t u r n s and other reports or returns made to governmental
authorities) at the d i s t r i c t office of Tenant or daily sales reports at the store
on the Premises; p r o v i d e d „ any inspection made pursuant to wis paragraph
must be made within two C2) y e a r s after the statement ox sales is mailed or
delivered by Tenant to Landlord and any such inspection shall be limited u>
the period covered by s u c h statement. Landlord agrees to hold in confidence
all sales figures and other information obtained from Tenant's r e c o r d s . If s u c h
audit reveals that T e n a n t ' s s a l e s have been understated by more than three p e r cent (3%), Tenant shall p a y all costs of the audit, in addition to additional rental
due.
Any claim b y Landlord for revision of any statement of sales o r .
for additional p e r c e n t a g e r e n t , which claim is not made to Tenant within two
(2) years after the date s u c h statement of sales is mailed or deliverecLto Landlord
shall be deemed and h e r e b y i s waived by Landlord,
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Tcnant makes no representation or warranty as to the sales it
expec:$ lo make in or cram the Premises or that u wdl use the Premises for
any particular purpose or at all.
References in this Lease :o a proportionate reduction or abatement
of rent shall not apply 10 percentage rent.
(4) TAXES. Landlord shall pay or cause to be paid all taxes
levied against the Shopping Center, including general property taxes and
special improvement taxes or assessments, and shall indemnify Tenant and
hold Tenant harmless from apy and all claims or demands for payment of any
such taxes or a s s e s s m e n t s ^ r o v i d e d , Tenant shall pay all taxes levied on
personal propercy and equipment owned by Tenant.
Tenant agrees to reimburse Landlord for the amount of such" )
taxes assessed against ;hc Premises during the original term of rhis_ Lease
(or as the same may be e x t e n c e o ) . Taxes for any partial year at the commencement of the term shall be prorated, Landlord shall endeavor to have the
Premises and the improvements thereon separately assessed for general
property taxes. Such separate assessment, if made, shall provide the basis
for tax reimbursement. If ^uch taxes "are not separately assessed, the portion
of such-taxes^xo^be reimbursed by Tenant shall be (i) with respect to taxes
on the'land, that portion thereof which the ground floor square footage of
the Premises bears to the square footage of the parcel for which the tax is
a s s e s s e d , and (ii) with respect to the improvements on the Premises, that
portion thereof which the value of die building and other improvements on
the Premises for property u x purposes beers cs the value c: all buildinjjs
and other improvements on the parcel for whicn the tax is assessed. Tenant
s a ail also reimburse Landlord for its pro rata share of the general property
Faxes assess eg_agajngr ^g^Ccjnmon^Areas, T enantTs pro rata share shall
be that portion thereof which the ground floor square footage of the Premises
bears to the total ground floor square footage of all buildings in the Shopping
Center. Tenant shall reimburse Landlord for its share of such general P^opcrty^
taxes within 30 days after receipt by Tenant of a statement setting forth the
amount due Landlord under the provisions of this article, together with the
original tax bill or a true copy thereof and a computation of the amount
to be paid by Tenant, determined as provided in this article. All amounts
paid by Tenant pursuant to this article, may be deducted by Tenant from any
percentage rent due for the calendar year in which such taxes were paid, regardl e s s of who may own Landlord's interest in this Lease at the nme. Tenant
may, in its own name or in the name of Landlord, contest any such assessment or tax but, in any such event» Landlord shall share in all costs and expenses
of contesting such assessment or tax j ^ i t s jnceresi may appear.
(5) COMMON AREAS AND PARKING. Landlord agrees to maintain
the Common Arj^^^Iiaxiuding all common concourses and malls) in good repair,
clean, s a f e , { O T * S e n t a b j c ^ y i i h all landscaped areas in a neat thriving condition,
reasonably free from ice and snow, adequately lighted during all hours Tenant
is normally open for business and with proper facilities for drainage ol surface
water and to provide adequate security protection. The parking areas shall
be maintained with adequate hard surfacing and proper directional signs and
striping for standard sice American automobiles.
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Tenant agrees to reimburse Landlord for Tcr.ant^share of
the actual cost incurred by Landlord for the expenses gToceracion^mainter.ance, repair and replacement of the Common Areas as Hennaed above,
far the premiums on liability insurance pertaining to the Cammon Areas which
Landlord is required to maintain by the provisions of Liis Lease, for the actuai
cast of depreciation and taxes on personal property ( e . g . . parking lot sweeper,
snow removal equipment) used exeiuYiveiy for the bene:;: ex the Common Areas
and lor the cose at power used jo.jjphj-fche Common Areas (but without any
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charge for deprep-'-r'nr'- af or taxes on the Common Areas, for the cost of
('
capital improvements thereon, or tor management or clerical services of
Landlord or its, agent) . Tenant's snare snail Dc 3 g'raction of such total cost,
the numerator of which is the ground floor building area leased to Tenant
and the denominator or" which is the total ground floor area of all buildingsC-/LC h±^Jj~ » ^
(excluding malls and sidewalks) in the Shopping Center and anv enlargement
£U**uUj 2
thereof ''including the area of the Premises). Tenant shall pay to Landlord
the sum of S300 s e r month as its estimated pro rata share of such costs, with
the actual costs to be adjusted annually. Tenant mav examine the accounts
^and original bills iav such costs at anv reasonable lime,
Tenant may as any time and from time to time, upon at least sixty
(60) days prior notice to Landlord, elect to assume Landlord's obligations to
maintain and repair Tenant's portion of the Common Areas (which area is
outlined and cross -hatched in orange on Exhibit "A - ), except fcr repaving
and other costs which cannot be practicably segregated or allocated to Tenant's
portion c: the Oarsmen Arccs (which costs shall continue to be proportionately
paid for by Tenant pursuant to the formula in the seconc paragraph 01 tins
article). in the even: ox s u c h assumption by Tenant. Tenant agrees to maintain and repair Tenant's portion of the Common Areas at its sole cost and expense, in a manner and ax a level of quality at least comparable to that of Landlord; provided, that any such assumption by Tenant shall not diminish Landlord's obligations or liability as set forth in the articles herein entitled •INDEMNIFICATION" and "LIABILITY INSURANCE.* Tenant may also elect to terminate
its obligations to maintain and repair Tenant's portion of the Common Areas
by giving at least sixty (60) days prior notice to Landlord, in which event
Landlord agrees to resume its duties as outlined in the first paragraph of this
article and Tenant agrees to pay for its pro rata share of such costs in accord
with the second paragraph a: this article.
If, without Tenant's prior written consent.
(a) Access by Tenant, its invitees, customers and employees to
the Shopping Center from adjacent streets or to and from the Premises
within the Shopping Center is altered from that shown on Exhibit i A . "
or
yL (b) The Common Areas are, for any reason, diminished to less than,
the vehicle parking and roadway ratio specified in this Lease,
then and in any of such e v e n t s , Tenant may. in addition to any other remedy
provided by law or this Lease, terminate this Lease by giving notice thereof
to Landlord, such termination to be effective 60 days after the date notice is
given, it being understood and agreed that such access and Common Areas
are essential to the use of the Premises by Tenant and is a fundamental provision
of tnis Lease and that any deprivation, alteration or modification th^rrnf fan,
anv-cause. regardless of Jaylt_by.Lanxllor.d^.is ^ufficient^cause for^uanUialtgO^
of ihU Lra*;* , .Rent shall be paid 10 the effective date of Termination And Tenant
shall be entitled 10 a refund of any r*M paid for any period after said effective
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park their motor vehicles in the Shopping Center, in areas which shall be
designated by Landlord at the request ot Tenant; provided, that eippioyees
of Tenant and other tenants i n the Shopping CtMtr shall not be permitted to
park in front of the building l e a s e d to Tenant nor1 in any areas the use o£ which
would unreasonably interfere with access to such building. Tenant agrees
to require its employees to paxk their motor vehicles at the places so designated.
No charge or other type of validation (or parking in the Shopping
Center may be made to e m p l o y e e s , invitees or customers of Tenant without
the prior written consent of T e n a n t , unless mandatorily imposed by governmental
authority.
The Common A r e a s may be used to the extent necessary in the
making of repairs and alterations to the buildings in the Shopping Center,
provided that such use s h a l l not unreasonably interfere with the use of or
access to the Premises by T e n a n t , its invitees, customers and employees.
(6) LANDLORD'S TITLE. Landlord covenants that Landlord has
good and marketable title to or a valid leasehold interest in the property included
within the Shopping Center, w i t h full right and authoriry to grant the estate
demised herein and to e x e c u t e and perform all of the terms and conditions
of this Lease.
Landlord a g r e e s that Tenant, upon paying the rent and performing
the other covenants of this Lea^e to be performed by Tenant, shall peaceably
and ouiedy have, hold and enjoy the Premises for the full term of this Lease
and as the same may be e x t e n d e d as provided herein.

Landlord c o v e n a n t s chat: (a) as of the date of this Lease, the Premises
are subject to no leases or t e n a n c i e s and the Shopping Center, including the
Premises, is subject to no restrictions* agreements, violations, mortgages,
encumbrances, liens, e a s e m e n t s or defects in title of any nature whatsoever •
other than those specifically s e t forth in Schedule "I" attached hereto and made
a part hereof; (b) as of the commencement date of the original term of this Lease,
the Premises are subject to no lea.sea or tenancies, except those listed on Schedule
"I" and this Lease; (c) as of the commencement date of the original term of this
Lease, the Premises, are s u b j e c t to no restrictions, agreements, violations, mortgages." encumbrances, l i e n s , easements or defects in title of any nature whatsoever
except those listed on S c h e d u l e "I" and those approved,in writing by Tenant (which
approval shall not be u n r e a s o n a b l y withheld); provided, that this shall not modify
the provisions of the article h e r e i n entitled "MORTGAGE BY LANDLORD; • and id)
as of a date no later than the commencement of the original term of this Lease, the
Premises are subject to no z o n i n g or other restrictions which would prohibit the.
operation by Tenant of a drug s t o r e and general mercantile business on the Premises
or prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages on or from the Premises (if not prohibited
by law and if Tenant obtains all necessary licenses at Tenant's expense) .
Promptly after e x e c u t i o n of this Lease, Landlord shall furnish
Tenant, without cost to T e n a n t , an abstract of title, copy of title insurance
policy, preliminary title report or other evidence of title satisfactory to Tenant*
showing that Landlord's title to the Premises is in the condition required by
this article. Landlord further a g r e e s when requested by Tenant in writing,
to forthwith provide Tenant with a current survey of the Shopping Center
showing (he location of all b u i l d i n g s in the Shopping Center in relation to the
legal description of the Shopping Center if Landlord has obtained such a survey .
The first such survey shall b e provided by Landlord without cost 10 Tenant,
but Tenant shall bear the full c o s t of any additional requested surveys.
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If Landlord grants this Lease by virtue of a leasehold interest
held by it, Landlord shall forthwtth provide Tcr.ant u>uh a fully executed copy
of the agreement and any amendments thereto creating Landlord's interest
and shall immediately upon receipt thereof, provide Tenant with a copy of
all notices received by La-ndlord from its lessor involving ir.y possible default
or other breach affecting Landlord's leasehold interest herein. If Landlord
defaults in the performance of any of the provisions c: such lease. Tenant
may make such payments and cure such default on benalf of Landlord. Tenant
may make payment of any defaults thereunder and Landlord agrees to reimburse
Tenant upon demand the amounts so paid by Tenant, together with interest
chereon at the rate of lOh p e r annum or the highest legal rate, whichever is
lower and. regardless of who may own Landlord's interest in this Lease at
the lime. Tenant may withhold ail payments of rent or other sums then or thereafter
due Landlord hereunder until the amounts withheld equal ihe amounts so paid
by Tenant, with interest thereon as aforesaid, which have not been reimbursed
by Landlord.
(7) NUISANCE. Tenant with respect to the Premises and Landlord
with respect to the Common Areas and any other property in or adjacent to
the Shopping Center owned or controlled by Landlord, shall not suffer or permit
the maintenance of any n u i s a n c e (including unusual noises and obnoxious
odors) or any use w h i c h w i l l increase the fire hazards.
(8) COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS . Tenant agrees not to violate any
health, building or zoning l a w , ordinance or regulation of any governmental
authority applicable to the building on the Premises and, if required by s u c h
governmental authority . s o l e l y by reason of Tenant's type of'cosiness* Tenant
will make nonstrucrurai r e p a i r s , improvements and alterations to the interior
of the building on the P r e m i s e s . Landlord agrees to make all other r e p a i r s ,
improvements or alterations to the Premises ind to die Common Areas required
by governmental authorities. If, by reason of the making of such r e p a i r s .
improvements or alterations by Landlord or by Tenant, Tenant is deprived
of the use or benefit of all or a substantial part of the Premises, rent shall
be abated or reduced according to the extent to which Tenant is deprived of
such use or benefit. Ail s u c h r e p a i r s , improvements and alterations shall
be done in accordance with plans and specifications approved by Landlord
and Tenant.
(9) UTILITIES . Tenant agrees to pay aU charges for electricity,
gas and water used by Tenant on the premises if the same are separately metered
to Tenant. Landlord shall provide a complete heating and cooling system for
the Premises in accordance with plans and specifications approved by the p a r t i e s
pursuant to the article entitled "PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS.11 Landlord
shall provide the facilities, up to the exterior wall of the building on the P r e m i s e s .
through which electricity, g a s , water, heat, air conditioning, telephone and
other utility services are s u p p l i e d to the interior of such building.
(10) SICNS . Tenant shall have Lhe right to maintain such s i g n s
on the interior of the P r e m i s e s as Tenant deems advisable, including such
signs as are visible from the exterior. Tenant may erect, maintain and replace
signs on the exterior of the building to be constructed on the ?remisa or e x t e n d ing therefrom of such s i z e and kind as are provided in the plans and specifications

approved by the parries pursuant to the article entitled "PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS" and such other Signs whether of the sa/ne or different size or kind
as Tenant deems a d v i s a b l e : provided, that lar.dlcrd shall have the right to approve
any change in Tenant's external signs (which approval shall not be unreasonably
withheld) if such c h a n g e is substantially different from Tenant's sign approved
pursuant to the article entitled "Pt^NS AND SPECIFICATIONS" and is substantially
different from other s i g n s then existing in the Shopping Center, In no event
shall a change of Tenant's name on any sign require Landlord's approval. Signs
of any sublessee or a s s i g n e e of Tenant shall be subject to Landlord's approval.
which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. If Landlord installs a
pylon sign for the p u r p o s e of designating tenants in the Shopping Center,
it is agreed that Tenant s h a l l have as equal prominence of designation on such
sign as Landlord's other tenants.
(11) FIXTURES , Tenant may install on the Premises such shelving .
frade fixtures and equipment as Tenant deems desirable. All of said items
~
installed by and at the e x p e n s e of Tenant shall remain Tenant's property whether
or not affixed or attached to the Premises. At any time during the term and
for 30 days after the expiration or termination of this Lease, Tenant may remove
s\id items fe-am the P r e m i s e s , repairing any damage caused by such removal
(which shall not i n c l u d e redecorating or repainting) but Tenant shall not be
obligated to remove such items or to restore the Premises to its condition at
the commencement of the term.
(12) REPAIRS . Landlord agrees to make and pay for ail repairs.
structural or o t h e r w i s e . to the exterior of the building on the Premises (including
\v;-w.iu: l;,—*:s:isn. thn reef, foundation and structural supports, walls, gutter*
and downspouts, but e x c l u d i n g plate glass and exterior doors) and to all p i p e s ,
wires, conduits, s e w e r s , drains and all other utility facilities through which
electricity, g a s . w a t e r , h e a t , air conditioning, telephone and other utility
services are s u p p l i e d to the interior of the building up to the exterior line
of such building; p r o v i d e d . Landlord shall not be obligated to^rnake asid pay
for any such rap airs if the need for the same is caused by the negligent act
or omission of Tenant u n l e s s the cost of making such repairs is covered by
any insurance maintained b y Landlord, in which event Landlord shall be obligated
to make and pay for s u c h r e p a i r s . Landlord further agrees to make and pay
for all repairs to the interior of such building which may be of z structural
nature and which are not made necessary by any unusual or negligent use
of the Premises by Tenant and such other repairs, structural or otherwise,
to the interior of the building as may be necessary by reason of Landlord's
failure to maintain the e x t e r i o r .
Landlord s h a l l be liable for all loss, damage or injury to T e n a n t s
Premises, trade f i x t u r e s , s u p p l i e s , inventory, other property on the Premises
and loss of b u s i n e s s resulting from any overflow, leakage or defect of exterior
walls, roof, foundation or structural supports, or from any leakage or defect
of any utility facilities w h i c h Landlord is required to provide and maintain,
or from the failure of Landlord to make any repairs required to be made by
Landlord, or from L a n d l o r d s negligence, or from faulty construction (unless
such construction was performed by Tenant) provided, that except for l o s s ,
damage or injury caused by Landlord's negligence or from faulty construction.
Landlord shall not be liable [or any such loss, damage or injury unless Landlord has been notified of the nctd for repairs and failed to make the same with
due diligence. Tenant agrees to promptly notify Landlord of the need to make
any repairs of which Tenant is aware, which are required herein to be made by
Landlord.

-8-

I£ by reason of the making of repairs required to be made by Landlord.
Tenant is deprived
of ihe use or benefit of ail or a part at the Premises, rent
shall be abated or r e d u c e d according to the extent to which Tenant is deprived
of such use or benefit.
Landlord a g r e e s that if in an emergency it shall become necessary
to make any repairs h e r e b y required, to be made by Landlord and Landlord
cannot be located by telephone and the cost of such repairs shall not exceed
$200, Tenant may. at its option, have the repairs made and pay the cost thereof
and, in such event, Landlord agrees to reimburse Tenant therefor upon demand,
or, if not so r e i m b u r s e d . Tenant may deduct the amount so expended by it
from any rent or other suras due Landlord from Tenant,
Tenant a g r e e s to make ana* pay for all repairs and replacements to the
interior of the building oa the Premises (including the repair and replacement
"
of plate glass and exterior doors) except such repairs as are herein to be made
by Landlord, Tenant a g r e e s to make and pay for repairs and replacements of
mechanical equipment on the Premises furnished and installed by Landlord for the
use of Tenant and Landlord hereby assigns to Tenant and agrees that Tenant shall
have the benefit of any guarantees oi manufacturers, dealers or installers
of such mechanical equipment, which guarantees Tenant may enforce in its
own name or in the name or Landlord. At the expiration or termination of this
Lease Tenant shall not be obligated to make any repairs or replacements of
such mechanical equipment and Landlord agrees to accept it in its then existing
condition.
Landlord a g r e e s to maintain the exterior of the building on the Premises which, if n e e d e d , s h a l l include painting thereof.
0 3 } ALTERATIONS . Landlord agrees thai Tenant may. at any
time and at its e x p e n s e , make such alterations, add icons and changes in and
to the building on the P r e m i s e s as Tenant deems advisable, except that Tenant
shall not thereby change the fire walls, make structural changes, or change
the exterior architectural appearance of such building without the written consent
of Landlord, which c o n s e n t shall not be unreasonably withheld. The closing,
relocation, alteration or other change to any door or opening into the building
on the Premises shall i n no event be deemed a change requiring the consent
of Landlord. All s u c h w o r k shall be done in accordance with all applicable
building and zoning l a w s and regulations and workmen1 s compensation and
labor laws. Tenant s h a l l not permit the lien of any contractor* subcontractor,
mechanic, materialman, Laborer, architect or of any other person arising out
o£ such alterations, additions or changes made by Tenant to be or remain a
lien upon the Premises u n l e s s the same is being contested in good faith by
Tenant and. in any e v e n t . Tenant shall indemnify and save Landlord harmless
from any such l i e n .
(14) INDEMNIFICATION. Tenant shall not be responsible or liable
for and Landlord a g r e e s to indemnify and de(cnd Tenant from all claims, damages.
ex^eixscs. liabilities and judgments for injury to persons, loss of life or damage
to property occurring in the Shopping Center (including the exterior of the
entrance to the building o a the Premises) and on the streets and sidewalks
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adjacent to the S h o p p i n g Center or growing out of or connected with the u s e ,
non-use, condition or occupation of the Shopping Center or of such streets
and sidewalks, e x c e p t s u c h injury, loss of U£e*br damage occurring in the
interior of the building on the Premises after such building has been constructed
in accordance with plan.s and specifications approved by Tenant and exclusive
possession thereof d e l i v e r e d to Tenant. Landlord shall not be liable for damage
or injury occasioned by the negligence of Tenant, its designated agents, s e r v a n t s ,
or employees unless c o v e r e d by any insurance maintained by Landlord. Landlord 1
liability under this p a r a g r a p h shall be reduced by the net proceeds from any
insurance carried by Landlord to the extent such proceeds are applied towards
payment of such c l a i m s , damages, expenses, liabilities and judgments.
Landlord shall not be responsible or liable for md Tenant agrees
to indemnify and defend Landlord from all claims, damages, expenses, liabilities
and judgments for injury to p e r s o n s , loss of life or damage to property occurring
within the interior of the building on the Premises after completion of the c o n s t r u c tion thereof in a c c o r d a n c e with plans and specifications approved by Tenant
and after exclusive p o s s e s s i o n thereof is delivered to Tenant. Tenant shall
not be liable for damage or injury occasioned by the negligence of Landlord,
its designated a g e n t s , s e r v a n t s or employees unless covered by insurance
maintained by T e n a n t . Tenant's liability under this paragraph shall be reduced
by the net proceeds from any insurance carried by Tenant to the extent such
proceeds are applied towards payment of such claims, damages, expenses.
liabilities and j u d g m e n t s .
Landlord and Tenant hereby waive any rights each may have
against the other on account at any loss or damage occasioned to Landlord or
Tenant, as the case »a.y b e , their respective property, the Premises (or its
contents) or to other portions of the Shopping Center, arising from any risk
generally covered by fire and extended coverage insurance; whether or not
the insurance p r o c e e d s arc sufficient to cover the loss; and the parties each,
on behalf of their r e s p e c t i v e insurance companies insuring the property of
either Landlord or Teztaxtt against any such loss, waive any right of subrogation
that it may have against Landlord or Tenant, as the case may be.
The p r o v i s i o n s of this article shall not apply to damage to or d e s t r u c tion of property w h i c h i s owned by Landlord or Tenant and as to such properry,
each party waives and r e l e a s e s any claim or cause of action for such damage
or destruction except as specifically provided in the articles entitled "REPAIRS"
and "DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION," it being agreed that each party shall provide
their own insurance or shall assume the risk of such damage or destruction
even though such damage or destruction is caused or contributed to by the
fault or neglect of the o t h e r .
(15) LIABILITY INSURANCE. •Landlord-agrees to maintain or cause
to be maintained on Landlord's behalf, liability insurance against claims for
bodily injury, death or p r o p e r t y damage occurring on. in or about the Shopping
Center (including the b u i l d i n g s therein) and the streets and sidewalks adjacent
to the Shopoing C e n t e r , with limits of not less than 51,000,000 for total claims for
bodily injury iiabillcy for any one occurrence and not less than $100,000 properry
damage or, in lieu thereof, a Combined Single Limi* of not less than SI . 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 .
Landlord shall p r o v i d e Tenant with sufficient evidence of such coverage and shaiV
name Tenant as an additional i n s u r e d therein.
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Tenant agrees to maintain insurance covering the inferior of the
building on :he Premises agamst claims of bodily injury liability and property
damage liability with the capability of paying claims to limits or not less than
SZSO,000 for claims of any one person r.at less than 51,000,000 for total claims
of any one occurrence and not less than £100,000 property damage or, in lieu
thereof, a Combined Single Limit at not less than 11,000,000. Such insurance
may be in the form of blanket liability coverage applicable to the Premises ~ ^
'worth of more than rwen:y million dollars, Tenant may insure in whole or in
part under any plan of self insurance which Tenant may from time to time have
in force and etfect, Tenant shall provide Landlord with sufficient evidence
of such coverage and a description of any such plan of self-insurance,

* vJ * V*"
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All policies of such bodily injury liability and property damage
liability insurance shall specifically insure the performance by Landlord or
Tenant, as the case may b e , of the indemnity agreement contained in the article
entitled "INDEMNIFICATION ,» Each party shall deliver to the other, a statement
of that party's insurance company that such insurance specifically insures
the performance by Landlord or Tenant, as the case may be, of the indemnity
agreement to limits not less than those specified in this article- Each party
shall promptly notify the other party of any asserted claim with respect to
which such party is or m&y be indemniized against hereunder, and shall deliver
to such party copies of process and pleadings.

;"JT~

(16) FBIE LMSURANCE. Landlord agrees to keep the building
on the Premises insured against loss or damage by fire and the penis commonly
covered under the standard extended coverage endorsement to die extent of
the replacement value thereof, including aJl improvements, alterations, additions
and changes made by Landlord or Tenant (even if caused by the negligence
of Tenant) , but excluding fixtures and equipment owned by Tenant, Such
insurance shall be carried for the protection of both Landlord and Tenant and
Tenant shall be named as one of the insured in all policies o£ such insurance
o r , in lieu thereof, the policy shall contain an express waiver of any right
of subrogation against Tenant. Ac any time during the terra of this Lease or any
extension thereof. Tenant -aay notify Landlord that Tenant will maintain and pay
for such insurance as \s required by this article, in which event Landlord shall
not be obligated to provide such insurance.
Such insurance policy shall contain a provision that the insurance
company will give Tenant 20 days notice in writing in advance-of any cancellation or l a p s e , or the effective date of any reduction in the amounts oi insurance,
Landlord shall provide Teaant'with satisfactory evidence of such insurance
c o v e r a g e . The proceeds of such insurance in case of loss or damage shall
be used by Landlord to restore the Premises as provided in this Lease to the
extent that such proceeds arc required for such purposes.
^Tenant agrees to reimburse Landlord for the amount ot the insurance^
premium within 3Q days alter receipt by Tenant of a statement setting forth the
amount of such premium attributable to the building on the Premises as determined
by the insurance company . U Tenant elects to maintain and pay for such insurance
as is required by this arr.cle. Tenant shill net be obligated to reimburse Landlord
/or any insurance premium paid by Landlord beyond the premium period in effect
when Tenant's in$ur%t\c^ commences (or for twelve calendar months from the date
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Tenant's notice to insure i s g i ^ e n , whichever period is shorter) and Tenant shall
be entUled to a proportionate amount of any insurance premium refunded to Landlord. All amounts paid by T e n a n t pursuant to this article may be deducted by
Tenant from any p e r c e n t a g e r e n t due for the calendar year in which such insurance
premiums are reimbursed b y Tenant; provided, if at any one time. Tenant r e i m burses Landlord for i n s u r a n c e premiums providing coverage lor more than one
year. Tenant may deduct from percentage rent for the current calendar year and
for each subsequent year or part thereof for which such premiums are paid, the
pro rata share of such r e i m b u r s e m e n t attributable to each year or portion thereof
of insurance c o v e r a g e .
(17) DAMAGE CR DESTRUCTION. Zf the Premises, the appurtenances
thereto, or the Common A r e a s shall be damaged or destroyed by fire or other
casualty or any other c a u s e w h a t s o e v e r , Landlord will forthwith proceed with
due diligence to remove aJiy d e b r i s and to restore '-he Premises and the Common
Areas, as the case may b e . to substantially the same condition as immediately
prior to such damage or d e s t r u c t i o n , including any improvements or alterations
thereon made by Landlord or T e n a n t .
If Tenant is d e p r i v e d of the use or benefit of any substantial portion
of the Premises either by r c a s a a of such damage or destruction or during the
period of restoration and repair,
rent shall be abated or reduced according
to the extent to which T e n a n t is so deprived of such use or benefit.
If such work for restoration and repair has not been completed
within rAnt (?) months after the occurrence of any such damage or destruction.
Tenant may tevminat* this Lea^e effective ai cf the date of such damage or
destruction by giving n o t i c e thereof to Landlord and consenting to the release
of any insurance p r o c e e d s .
Should s u c h daxaage or destruction occur during the last \ y e a r s
of the original term of this L e a s e or during any extended term thereof. Tenant
or Landlord may terminate t h i s Lease effective as of the date of such damage
or destruction by giving n o t i c e thereof to the other party not later, than fortyEve (45) days after s u c h d a m a g e or destruction.
If at any time d u r i n g the original term or during any option term,
the buildings then comprising- the Shopping Center shall be so extensively
damaged that 50% or more of -he rentable space therein Is rendered untenantable
and regardless of whether t h e Premises be damaged in*such happening:
(a) From the date of such damage or destruction and until
the Shopping C e n t e r is completely restored to its loraer condition
and made t e n a n t a b l e . no installments of annual rent shall be
payable or s h a l l b e or become due; and
(b) T e n a n t m a y terminate this Lease effective as of the date
of such damage b y g i v i n g notice thereof to Landlord, unless ( i )
within f o r t y - f i v e ( 4 5 ) days after the occurrence of such damage
Landlord g i v e s n o t i c e to Tenant that it intends to repair and restore
the Shopping C e s t e r to substantially the same condition as prior
to such damage a n d commences such work of restoration and
repair, and ( i i ) w i t h i n nine (9) months after the occurrence of
such damage, t h e Shopping Center is so restored.
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In the even: of any termination a: this Lease pursuant to this arncle,
rent shall he paid IQ the effective date of termination ^nd Tenant snail be enmicd
to a refcad of any rent paid for any period aitcr said effective date.
(18) CONDEMNATION . If any portion of or interest in ;he Shopping
Center, including without limitation, the Premises, the Common Areas or any
of the buildings in the Shopping Center shall be condemned or taken by any
public authority or by any other person or corporation under any statute,
by eminent domain ar by p u r c h a s e in lieu thereof, and such condemnation
or Uk;ng rzndcrs the Premises unsuitable in the judgment of Tenant for Tenant's
business operations (which determination by Tenant shall not be unreasonably
made), Tenant may terminate this Lease by giving notice thereof to Landlord
not later than 60 days alter p o s s e s s i o n is taken by the condemning authority.
e l e c t i v e as of the date said notice is given; provided, in no event may Tenant
terminate this Lease if only a portion of the Common Areas is so condemned
or taken and af;er such condemnation or taking, the entrances and exits to the Shopping Center remain or are relocated to the approval of Tenant (which shall not be
unreasonably withheld) , l e s s than a total of ten percent (1*0%) a£ che Common Area is
so condemned and the parking area is within reasonable and similarly convenient p r o x imity to the Premises. Rent shall be paid to the effective date of termination and Tenant
shall be entitled to a proportionate reiund of any rent paid for any period after
said effective date. If Tenant does not elect eo terminate, Landlord shall restore
the Shopping Center to a complete architectural and merchandising unit, all
in accordance with plans and specifications approved by Tenant. Any amounts
awarded to Landlord as a resuir of such condemnation cr taking shall be used
for such restoration to the extent required, If this Lease is not so terminated,
it shall continue, except that commencing with the date on which Tenant is
deprived of the use ox any portion of the P r e m i t s or of any rights under this
Lease, rent shall be abated or reduced according to the extent to which Tenant
i s deprived of the use or benefit of the Premises or oi such rights.
Whether or net this Lease is terminated as a result of any such
condemnation or taking, both Landlord and Tenant shall he free to s a k e claim
against the condemning party for the amount of actual provable damage done
to each of them as a result of s u c h condemnation and shall share in any award
made as their interests may appear.
(19) MORTGAGE BY LANDLORD. Tenant enters into and accepts
this Lease and the leasehold interest and estate of Tenant hereunder subject
and subordinate to any first mortgage or first trust deed which may now or
hereafter be executed upon, or with, respect to, the Premises 7 , and any renewal
or extension of any such mortgage or trust decdi provided, that such subordination shall not apply to any s u c h mortgage or trust deed which does not provide
(or whose owner or holder docs not in writing agree) that (i) this Lease shall
not be terminated and the p o s s e s s i o n of Tenant hereunder shall not be disturbed
by reason of any foreclosure or sale or other proceeding taken in connection
with any such mortgage or trust d e e d , and (ii) that the Uen of such mortgage
or trust deed shall not aifect any fixtures, equipment or property owned or
removable by Tenant. Tenant may make payment of any defaults under any
such mortgage or crust d^d and Landlord agrees to reimburse Tenant upon
demand the amounts so paid by Tenant, together with interest thereon at the
rate of 10% per annum or the h i g h e s t legal rate, whichever is lower, and regardl e s s of who may own Landlord's interest, in this Lease at the time. Tenant may
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withhold all payments of rent or other sums thenar thereafter due Landlord
hereunder until the amounts withheld equal the amounts so paid by Tenant,
with interest thereon as aforesaid, which have not been reimbursed by Landlord.
(20) UNPERFORMED COVENANTS CF LANDLORD. If Landlord
fails to make any repairs or do any work required ax Landlord by the provisions
of this Lease or in any other respect fails to perform any of the covenants,
terms or conditions ax this Lease to be performed by Landlord and such default
continues for a period of 30 days aiter written demand for performance is given
by Tenant, then and in any of such events, Tenant may make such payments
and cure such defaults on behalf of Landlord ind, in connection therewith,
do all work and make all payments deemed necessary by Tenant, including
costs and charges in connection with any legal action which may have been
commenced or threatened. Landlord agrees to reimburse Tenant upon demand
the amounts so paid by T e n a n t , together wich interest thereon at the rate of
10% ptr annum or the h i g h e s t legal rate, whichever is lower, md regardless
of who may own Landlord's interest in this Lease at the time, so long as not
prohibited by Landlord's mortgage or other financing to which this Lease is
subordinate. Tenant may withhold all payments of rent or other sums then
or thereafter due Landlord until the amounts withheld equal the amounts so
paid by Tenant, with i n t e r e s t thereon as aforesaid, which have not been reimbursed
by Landlord.
Tenant may not make any payment pursuant to this article of any
tax. assessment, encumbrance or other obligation affecting the Premises so
long as Landlord is contesting the amount or validity of any-such obligation
in good faith and until s u c h contest has been judicially determined or otherwise
settled and thereafter Landlord fails or refuses to pay the same.
If at the expiration of this Lease or any extension thereof there
6hall be any sums owing b y Landlord to Tenant, Tenant may, so long as not
prohibited by Landlord's mortgage or other financing to which this Lease is
subordinate, by g i v i n g written notice to Landlord', extend this Lease until
January 31st of the year following the date when the indebtedness of Landlord
to Tenant would have b e e n fully paid by application of the annual rent to such
indebtedness, but in no e v e n t shall such extension exceed 5 years.
(21) UNPERFORMED COVENANTS OF TENANT. If Tenant shall
default in the performance of any of the terms or previsions of this Lease other
than the provisions r e q u i r i n g the payment of rent or other sums of money*
and if Tenant shall fail to c u r e such default within 30 days afier receipt of
written notice thereof from Landlord, or. if the default is of such character
as to require more than 30 d a y s to cure and Tenant shall fail to use reasonable
diligence in curing s u c h default, Landlord may not forfeit or terminate this
Lease or prohibit or r e s t r i c t the use or enjoyment of the Premises by Tenant
by reason of such default, but Landlord shall have any other remedy provided
by law, In addition, Landlord may cure such default for the account and at
the expense of Tenant and all sums so expended by Landlord, including costs and
charges in connection with any legal action which may have been threatened or
commenced, together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum or the
highest legal rate, w h i c h e v e r is lower, shall be paid by Tenant-on demand.
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C22) DEFAULT BY TENANT. If any one or more of the following
event* (fyerein called "default") shall happen *nd be continuing namely:
(a) Tenant shall fail to pay any rent or other sum of money
to Landlord w h e n the same is due and such failure continues
for 15 days after Landlord has given Tenant written notice
specifying the amount due;
(b) Tenant shall file a voluntary pttuion ir. bankruptcy
or a petition or answer seeking a reorganization, arrangement,
composition, readjustment, liquidation, dissolution or other
relief of the same or different kind under any provision of the
Bankruptcy Ac: or Tenant shall make an assignment for the
benefit a£ creditors;
( c ) An involuntary petition in bankruptcy again*t
Tenant or petition or answer made by a person other than
Tenant s e e k i n g a reorganisation, arrangement, composition,
readjustment, liquidation, dissolution or other relief against
Tenant of the same or different kind under any provision of
the Bankruptcy Act is filed or if a receiver is appointed having
jurisdiction ox the business property or assets of Tenant
on the P r e m i s e s , and. in any of such events. If Tenant shall
not properly commence and expeditiously pursue action to
dismiss any s u c h involuntary petition or answer or to vacate
such r e c e i v e r s h i p and, if after diligently exhausting Tenant's
r e m e d i e s , s u c h petition shall not be dismissed or the receiver*
ship vacated;
then, and in any of s u c h e v e n t s . Landlord shall have the immediate right to
re-enter the Premises and e x p e l Tenant or any person, or persons occupying
tho same, with or without legal p r o c e s s , and in any such event. Tenant agrees
to peacefully and quietly y i e l d up and surrender the Premises to Landlord;
provided, if a default o c c u r s under subparagraph "(a)" above and there be
a bona fide dispute as to the existence of such default or of the amount due
and all undisputed amounts are paid, said 15 day period specified in subparagraph
•(a)" shall not commence to run until such dispute is settled by final court
decree, arbitration or mutual agreement.
Should Landlord elect to re-enter as herein provided or to take
possession pursuant to legal proceedings, or otherwise. Landlord may either
terminate this Lease by g i v i n g written notice to Tenant or from time to time
and without terminating this L e a s e , relet the Premises or any part thereof
for such term or terms ( w h i c h may be for a term extending beyond the term
of this Lease) and at s u c h rental or rentals and upon such other terms and
conditions as Landlord deems advisable; provided that Landlord shall use
its best efforts to obtain the b e s t rent available thereon. Upon any such reletting,
Tenant shall be immediately liable to pay to Landlord the cost and expense
of such reletting, the cost of any alterations and repairs deemed necessary
by Landlord to effect s u c h reletting and the amount, if any, by which the annual
rent reserved in this Lease for the period of such reletting (but not beyond
the term of this Lease) e x c e e d s the amount agreed to be paid as rent for the
Premises for such period of reletting, If Tenant has been credited with any
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rent to be received from s u c h reletting and such rent shall not be promptly
paid to Landlord by the new tenant. Tenant shall immediately be liable to pay
such deficiency to Landlord. If Landlord elects :Q terminate this Lease, written
notice to that effect specifying the ei(ec:\v/e date of termination shall be given
by Landlord to Tenant and in such event, Landlord may recover from Tenant
all damages Landlord may incur by reason of Tenant's failure to pay rent.
including the cost of recovering the Premises and including the excess of the
annual rent reserved in this Lease for phe remainder of the anginal term (or
any extended term then in effect) over the then reasonable rental value of
the Premises for (he remainder of such term, all of which amounts shall be
immediately due and payable by Tenant to Landlord.
(23) COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES. The costs, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, of any action brought to enforce any of the terms or provisions
of this Lease, shall be borne by the party adjudged by the court to have violated
any of the terms or p r o v i s i o n s of this Lease,
(24) NOTICES AND PLACE FOR PAYMENT OF RENT. Any notice
or demand given or served by either party to this Lt&st to the other shall
nol be deemed to have been duly given or acrv^d unless in writing and forwarded
by certified or registered mail (return receipt requested), postage prepaid,
addressed as follows:
To the Landlord at:

351 California Street
San Francisco. California 94104

To the Tenant at:

Post Office Box 65S
Salt Lake Ciry, Utah 84110

Rent shall be paid to Landlord at the address set forth in this
article. No successor to Landlord's interest shall be entitled to receive rent
payments until Tenant shall have been furnished with (a) a letter signed by
the grantor of such interest setting forth the name and address of the person
entitled to receive such rent and (b) a photostatic copy of the deed or other
instrument by which such interest p a s s e d .
The person and the place to which notices are to be mailed may
be changed by either party by written notice to (he ot^er party.
(25) PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS. Landlord agrees to construct
a building an the Premises in accordance with plans and specifications approved
in writing by Tenant but prepared at Landlord's expense. Tenant shall cooperate
with Landlord in the furnishing of all necessary information» plans and sketches
to show T e n a n t s requirements for such building. If on or before October i , 1974.
final plans and specifications have not been approved by Tenant, Landlord or
Tenant may terminate this Lease by giving noiice thereof to the other parry. Upon
approval in writing of final plans and specifications by Tenant. Landlord shall o b tain a building permit and diligently proceed with the construction of the building
on the Premises . If such construction is not commenced on or before January
1. 1975, Tenant may terminate this Lease by giving notice thereof to Landlord.
If such construction is commenced prior to approval in writing by Tenant of
final plans and soecifications. Tenant may at any lime prior to the.commencement

-loot the original term of ih;a L e a s e , do any OP all of jhe following: terminate
this Lease by giving n c a e e thereof to Landlord, gbum injunctive relief against
Landlord, recover all damages suffered by Tenant or exercise *ny other remedy
a: law or in equity.
(2o) CONSTRUCTION PERIOD . Dur;ng the period of construction
of the building on the P r e m i s e d . Landlord agrees that Tenant through its proper
representatives, shall at ail times have access to the work at the Premises
or wherever it may be ;a preparation and Landlord will provide proper facilities
for such access and for i n s p e c t i o n of the work. U Tenant condemns any work
or material as failing eo conform to the plans ^nd specifications approved in
wricing by Tenant or as the same may have been changed with the written approval
of Tenant, Landlord, without e x p e n s e to Tenant, shall promptly remove all
such condemned material and promptly replace all condemned work and all
work damaged or d e s t r o y e d by any defective workmanship and material or
by its removal and shall r e p l a c e the same with materials or workmanship conforming to the plans and specifications approved by Tenant. Provided, that if Landlord
disagrees with any such condemnation of work or material. Landlord and Tenant
shall select an independent architect who shall, within forty-eight (48) hours
after the matter is submitted to him, decide whether or not such work or material
conforms fo the plans arid specifications and Landlord and Tenant agree to be
bound by such decision*
Landlord a g r e e s that Tenant may enter the Premises prior to completion of the construction of the b u i l d i n - cci the Prssaiaa: for the purpose if installation of its shelving, trade fixtures and equipment and such entry shall not
be considered as an acceptance of the Premises by Tenant. Tenant agrees
that shelving, trade fixtures and equipment will be installed in such a way
that the work of construction will not be interfered with unduly.
{17) COMMENCEMENT OF ORIGINAL TERM. The original term
of this Lease shall not commence until the following conditions occur;
(a) The b u i l d i n g on the Premises is completed in
accordance with plans and specifications approved by
Tenant, e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n of the Premises is delivered
to Tenant and either (;) 30 days shall elapse after
possession is so d e l i v e r e d or Cu) Tenant opens for
business on the P r e m i s e s prior to the expiration of such
30 day p e r i o d , w h i c h e v e r first occurs;
(b) Adequate means of access as shown on Exhibit
"A" to and frorn the Premises are ready for use. the
parking areas in the Shopping Center are hard surfaced
and striped for automobile parking and such parking
areas and other portions of the Common Areas are
substantially complete and adequately lighted:
(c) Construction of small shops located either between or to
the side of the major tenants as outlined in yellow on Exhibit UA"
shall have b e e n completed;
(d) Tenant shall h a v e been furnished proof
satisfactory to it that the following tenants have entered
into leases with Landlord for space in the Shopping
Center at the locations indicated on Exhibit *A», for the
following terms and for an area not less than that

-I?indicaied and. in addition, such tenants shall have
opened for b u s i n e s s at such locations or be in possession
of such space and obligated to open far business therein
prxor to or contemporaneously wvth Tenant's opening
tar b u s i n e s s on the Premises:
Tenant
Safeway

Term
25 years

Square Footage
20,000

(c) Tenant shall have been furnished prooj satisfactory \o it that
Ernst Hardware Cor a comparable tenant approved by Tenant, which
approval shall not be unreasonably withheld) has entered into a lease
with Landlord at the location indicated on Exhibit "A" for a minimum
term of 25 y e a r s and a minimum square Rootage of 36,000 square feet.
Such tenant shall be obligated to open for business therein on a date
no later than s i x (6) months from the date Tenant ap*&s for business.
Tenant may occupy the Premises and open for business thereon before
all of said conditions have b e e n fulfilled but such action shall not be considered a
waiver of such conditions. For any period after Tenant so opens for business
prior to the occurrence of all such conditions. Tenant shall pay to Landlord as
rent for the Premises an amount equal to 1-1/2% of Tenant's gross sales computed
as provided in the article entitled "PERCENTAGE RENT" made in or from the
Premises during the period after Tenant opens for business and until the commencement
of the original term of this Lease, such rent to be paid to Landlord in a lump sum
not later than SO days alter the commencement of the original term of this Lease,
The gross sales during s u c h period prior to the commencement of the original
term of this Lease shall not be taken into account in the computation of the
rtnt provided for i n the article entitled "PERCENTAGE RENT" in respect to
the Calendar year in which the original term of this Lease commences.
If s u c h conditions occur after any September 15th and prior to
the succeeding January 1st, Tenant may, in its discretion, accept possession
of the Premises, but shall not be obligated to pay rent until the succeeding
January 31st, u n l e s s Tenant opens for business on the Premises prior to said
date.
CBS) ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLETTING. Tenant may sublet the
Premises or any portion thereof or assign this Lease for any lawful purpose.
Tenant shall, except where such assignment or subletting is to a corporation or
other business related to Tenant by way of merger, joint venture or is a related
company or subsidiary of Tenant, give notice to Landlord of its intent \o sublease
qr a s s i g n . Landlord shall have fifteen (15) days after such notice is given to
notify Tenant that it d i s a p p r o v e s of such action; otherwise, Landlord's approval
shall be deemed to b e g i v e n . If Landlord disapproves Tenant's contemplated assign*
ment or subletting, Tenant may terminate this Lease by giving notice thereof to
Landlord, such termination to be effective as of the date stated in the notice.
In the event of such assignment or subletting, Tenant shall remain liable to
Landlord as guarantor of the performance of all the terms, conditions and provisions of this Lease to be performed by Tenant.
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(29) EXECUTION OF LEASE. RECORDING. Landlord agrees to
pay iny and all fees and c o m m i s s i o n s , including tinder's ices, for bringing
about the execution and d e l i v e r y of this Lease and agrees to indemnify Tenant
and save Tenant h a r m l e s s of and from any and all claims for such tecs and
commissions. The s i g n i n g of this Lease by Landlord does not constitute a
completed transaction u n t i l s u c h time as this Lease shall have been accepted
by Tenant and executed b y its proper officers. This lease agreement shall
not be recorded, but the l e a s e which has been executed contemporaneously
herewith shall be r e c o r d e d .
(30) MISCEULANEOUS PROVISIONS. Nothing herein contained
shall be deemed or c o n s t r u e d by the parties hereto or by any third parry ascreating the relationship of principal and agent or of partnership or of joint
venture becu/een the p a r t i e s h e r e t o , it being understood and agreed that neither
the method of computation of rent nor any other provision contained h e r e i n .
nor any acts of the p a r t i e s h e r e t o * shall be deemed to create any relationship
between the parties h e r e t o o t h e r than the relationship of landlord and tenant.
In the event TenaJit shall hold over and remain in possession of
the Premises after the e x p i r a t i o n of this Lease, such holding over shall not oper*
ate as * renewal or e x t e n s i o n of this Lease but shall only create a tenancy from month to month and shall b e on all of the terms and conditions of this L e a s e .
Tenant a g r e e s at any time and from tine to time upon not l e s s than
ten (10) days prior r e q u e s t b y Landlord, to execute, acknowledge and d e l i v e r
to Landlord, a statement i n w r i t i n g certifying the date of commencement of this
Lease that this Lease is u n c o d i f i e d and in full force and effect (or if there h a v e
been modifications, stating s u c h modifications and the date *herce£) , without
default (or if there are a n y ceJtaults known to Tenant generally describing the
same) and further stating t h e dates to which the annual rent and other c h a r g e s
have been paid, and s e t t i n g forth such other matters as may reasonably be r e quested by Landlord*
Except as o t h e r w i s e expressly provided in this Lease, at the e x p i r a tion or termination of this L e a s e . Tenant agrees to peaceably and promptly
surrender possession of t h e P r e m i s e s to Landlord in its then condition and
Tenant shall not be r e q u i r e d to restore the Premises to its condition at the
commencement of the o r i g i n a l term .
The various r i g h t s and remedies herein contained and r e s e r v e d
to each of the parties e x c e p t as. h e r e i n otherwise expressly provided, shall
not be considered as e x c l u s i v e of any other right or remedy of such party but
shall be construed as c u m u l a t i v e and shall be in addition to every other remedy
now or hereafter existing at l a w , in equity or by statute. No delay or omission
of the right to exercise a n y p o w e r or remedy by either party shall impair any
such right, power or r e m e d y o r be construed as & waiver of any default or
non-performance or as a c q u i e s c e n c e therein.
This L e a s e , a l t h o u g h drafted by Tenant, shall be interpreted
and construed only by the c o n t e n t s hereof and there shall be no presumption
or standard of construction i n favor of or against either Landlord or Tenant.
The headings of the several articles and sections contained h e r e i n
are for convenience only a n d do not define, limit or construe the contents of
such articles and s e c t i o n s .

-19When required by context, she singular shall include the plural
and the neuter gender shall include a person, corporation, fins or association.
If any provision of this Lease is declared invalid in a court proceeding between the parties h e r e t o , such invalidity shall not invalidate this Lease,
and this Lease shall be construed as if the invalid part were not contained
herein and the rights and obligations of che parties shall be construed and
enforced accordingly.
This Lease is and shall be considered to be the only agreement
or understanding between the parties hereto. All negotiations and oral agreements
acceptable to both parties have been incorporated herein* It may not be amended
or modified by any act or conduct oi the parties or by oral agreement, unless
reduced to writing*
All oi the r i g h t s and obligations of the parties undeT this Lease
shall bind and the benefits shall inure to their respective heirs» legal representatives* successors and a s s i g n s .
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Lease has been executed as of the
day and year first above written.
HILLSIDE PLAZA ASSOCIATES,
a partnership

<^- ~*sa»K

«©/

&L.

Its General Parmer

LANDLORD

SKAGGS COMPANIES, INC.

TENANT
Attest-

Ap?f»»«j •* I-* '<•*»

Attes c,

_

u

^

f

^

t

^

jdffitf'

Secretary
[Corporate JSeall
• * -• V. •

^ ^ ^

""*

t
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5CHEDULE "IS p e c i d c l i s t of r e s t r i c t i o n s , agreements v i o l a t i o n s , m o - i g a g e a ,
e n c u m b r a n c e s , l i e n s , c i s c m s r . u unci S e l e c t s m i;clc^ E l e c t i n g the S h o p p i n g
Center and the P r e m i s e s (a)

Taxei for rhe year 197-4, now a lien, nor ycf due or payable.

(b)

Said property l i e s wtrhin rhe boundries of the Salt Lake County Cottonwood
Sanitary Disrricr. and is subject to qil charge* and assessments thereof.
Subjec: to payment o f connection fee upon Qppl leaf ion to connecr.

(c)

Said ptoperry lie* w i t h i n rhe boundncs af fh« Salt Lake County Service A/ea
N o , 2 — C o t t o n w o o d H e i g h t s , determined and declarea to be extended services
urhich ihclt be r e c r e a t i o n a l facilities and services through the construct ion,
operation ond maintenance
of extended local parks and recreation facilities
not now furnished by the County in the Cottonwood Heignrs Area, and is
subject to all c h a r g e s and assessments thereof, as recited in Ordinance
recorded a* Entry N o , 2 2 2 6 3 2 7 in Book 26)6 ar Page 59 of rhe Official Records.

(d)

Right of way and e a s e m e n t for the Green Flake Ditch ovar and ocross the herein
described property ( l o c o r i o n not aisclased) as recited in mesne instruments af
record.

(e)

A perpetual e c s e m e n f and right of way for the erection and continued
maintenance, r e p a i r , a l t e r a t i o n , and replacement af the electric
transmission f distribution ond telephone circuits of the Grantee, and
2 guy anchors ar\d no p o l e s , with the necessary guys, stubs, crasx-qrm*
and other a t t a c h m e n t s thereon, ar affixed thereto, for the xupport of said
circuits, to be e r e c r e d and maintained upon and across the premises of the
Grantor, in Solr Lake County, Utah, qiong a line described as follows:
Two guy anchors l o c a t e d on the Grantor') land at a point 54 feet South and
445 feet £ast, more or l e s s , from the North one quarter corner of Section 27,
Township 2 S o u t h , R c n g e 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, and being in the Northwest
quorter of the N o r t h e a s t quarter of said Section 2 7 .
Together with all righrs of ingress and egress necessary ar convenient for the Full
and complete u s e , o c c u p a t i o n and enjoyment af the easement hereby granted,
and all righrs and p r i v i l e g e s incident thereto, including the righr to cut ond
remove timber, t r e e s , brush, overhanging branches and other obstructions which
may injure or interfere with the Grantee's use, occupation or enjoyment of this
easement, os gronted to (Jtoh Power 4 Light Company by Pole Line Eosemenr
recorded N o v e m b e r 3 0 . 1964, as Entry N o . 2044304 m Book 2265 at Page 2 8 0
of the O f f i c i o ! R e c o r d s .

(f)

Easements over the following described real property in Salt Lake County, S t a t e
of Utah:
Beqfnning at a p o i n t on the South line of 7000 South Street, said point being South
8 9 * 5 r 3 Q " East 8 8 , 5 7 feet along the Section line ond South 0 ° 0 8 ' 3 0 " West 3 3 . 0 0
feet from the N o r t h quarter corner of Section 27, Township 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Bose and M e r i d i a n , and running thence Souih 64°0Q' East 4 5 . $ o (+*ti
thence South 8 9 © 5 l r 3 0 M Eos* 1967.48 feet along a line parallel to ond 2 0 , 0 feet
from the South t i n * or 7000 South Street to rhe South right of way line »o the South
line of 7000 South S t r e e t , thence North a S ^ l ' S O " West 1849.50 feet olong South
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(Continued)

tine of 7000 South Street to the point of beginning.
The purpose of this easement il to grant and convey unto Salt Lake County,
i n officers, employees, agents and assigns, the right to enter upon the
above descrfbed property far the purpose of constructing a 42" concrete
pipeline through the above described property and the Grantee, Sal) Lad*
County, iholl ot all times protect Grantors property from any domcge from
the installation and maintenance of the said drainage pipeline ond shall
reploce Grantors property to its original condition existing at the time'
immediarely prior to doing any xork in the installation and maintenance
of said pipeline Insofor as ir is reasonable possible to do so, as ^rant^d
to Salt Lake Counry, a body corporate and politic, by Easement recorded
May 24, 1967 os Entry N o . 2200599 in Book 2557 at Page 50 of the Official
Records.

